考虑一个在线市场，具备“合作-竞争”关系的两个卖家（一个制造商和一个代理商）通过在线平台销售商品给消费者。制造商和代理商可以从平台处获取消费者的个人偏好信息，并利用这些信息为消费者提供个性化的价格。而消费者可以采取有成本的行动来保护自己的信息。我们研究了消费者保护隐私的行为对平台信息分享策略、制造商和代理商的利润、消费者剩余以及社会福利的影响。研究发现：（1）平台、制造商和代理商都偏好完全信息分享策略，并且制造商和代理商选择只接受部分消费者信息；（2）当消费者隐私保护成本较低、平台只与代理商分享的情况下，消费者剩余最高，而平台只与制造商分享信息的情况下，社会福利最高；（3）当消费者隐私保护成本很高、平台不分享信息的情况下，消费者剩余和社会福利最高。研究结果丰富了关于信息分享和消费者个人隐私信息价值的研究，有助于行业监管者和政策制定者制定消费者隐私保护政策。

Consider an online marketplace where two sellers (a manufacturer and an agent) in a “co-opetitive” relationship sell goods to consumers through an online platform. The manufacturer and the agent can obtain information about consumers' individual preferences from the platform and use this information to personalize prices for consmers. Consumers can take costly actions to protect their information. We study the impact of consumers’ privacy-preerv-ing behavior on the platform's information-sharing strategies, the profits of the manufacturer and the agent, consumer surplus, and social welfare. We find that: (i) The platform, the manufacturer, and the agent all prefer a full information-sharing strategy, and the manufacturer and the agent choose to receive only partial consumer information. (ii) Consumer surplus is highest under the platform sharing only with the agent when the cost of consumer privacy protection is low, and social welfare is highest under the platform sharing  information only with the manufacturer. (iii) When the cost of consumer privacy protection is high, consumer surplus and social welfare are highest under the platform that does not share information. Our findings enrich the research on information sharing and the value of information about consumers' personal privacy, and can help industry regulators and policymakers formulate consumer privacy protection policies.